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Introduction
Most economists, without much prompting, would claim that the annual rate of growth
in public expenditure since 1990 has been “excessive”. However, the case is distinctly
underwhelming if it relies on standard macro economic arguments. The general
Government Deficit (GGD) has been kept below 3% of GDP each year since 1987 and
this year we’re on track for a budget surplus. By the end of the year the debt-GDP
ratio is likely to be about 66% - below the EU average and almost 30 points lower than
in 1989. Hardly the stuff to engender a mood of restraint among decision makers.
Table 1
Fiscal Ratios and Current Government Spending, 1990-1997
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Budget Deficit*
(% GDP)
2.3 2.3 2.5 2.4 1.7 1.9 1.0 (0.2)
Govt. Debt*
(% GDP)
95.8 95.0 92.0 94.5 87.9 81.6 73.0 66.0
Spending**
Growth (% p.a.)
6.9 9.9 10.0 7.8 7.3 6.9 4.9 7.3
Spending**
(% GDP)
28.2 29.7 30.6 30.6 30.2 29.0 27.6 27.2
*  General Government
**  Gross Supply Services
If the case for spending restraint has not been found persuasive by decision makers in
these circumstances, an appeal for restraint on the basis of possible fiscal pitfalls
lurking up ahead is unlikely to be any more compelling. This line of argument has
precious little galvanising effect on the decision-makers since the construction of
scenarios in which fiscal imbalances emerge at some future date requires that
assumptions and forecasts be made in relation to the key variables involved and these
assumptions/forecasts are subject to dispute and uncertainty. Basing a particular
spending rule (e.g., that real current spending growth be limited to 2% per annum) on
a set of medium-term forecasts that envisage GNP growth of 4% per annum is an2
invitation to exceed the spending target if the GNP forecasts prove to be too
conservative.
Clearly we are not suggesting that the rate of spending growth is a matter of
indifference because of the present and prospective financial health status of the public
finances. The enduring case in our view, for not so much restraint, as for prudent
appraisal of public expenditure, rests on fundamental principles that are all too
infrequently invoked in public debate. The most basic of the principles involved are: (i)
that public resources are the property of the citizens of the State and not of politicians,
civil servants, government departments or interest groups, and (ii) that, however
strongly tax revenues are growing, resources remain scarce: their application in one
area necessarily implies an opportunity cost in terms of foregoing options to spend in
other areas or levying higher taxes than would otherwise be required. These principles
imply the need for transparency in decision making and that government should be fully
accountable to the citizens for the way in which public resources are spent.
The spending record since 1990 provides prima facie evidence that these principles
were not to the fore in the deliberations of decision makers in recent years. Now one
can suggest that this may have been due to an absence of a political willingness among
successive governments to tackle powerful interest groups whose expectations were
fuelled by a rapidly expanding economy. Its burgeoning coffers and an almost
messianic desire to "share the fruits of growth" undoubtedly intoxicated government
itself. By implication it might seem that a government, armed with no more than a
conviction to stand up to the powerful lobbies, would have succeeded in curtailing
“excessive” spending growth.
Our thesis, however, is that it is the process of determining the quantum of public
expenditure that has contributed most towards the apparent failure to exercise greater
spending restraint. This process we believe is characterised by a tendency towards
fiscal illusion (von Hagen and Harden (1994) and Milesi-Ferrett1 (1997)). In this
framework there is a failure to fully internalise the true economic costs of public
expenditure. The narrow interests of individual spending ministers dominate over the3
collectivist concerns of the Minister of Finance and the Taoiseach. Consensus is arrived
at in Cabinet on the basis of the spending ministers, either explicitly or implicitly,
backing each other bids resulting in “something for everyone” and thus a sub-optimal
overall level of spending.  If this framework accurately reflects the actual process of
public expenditure determination then intra-governmental institutional reform is
required to redress the situation.
The failure of the Rainbow to adhere to its self-imposed and historic spending cap
convinces us further of the need to introduce a thorough going reform of the political
and administrative process of public expenditure determination.
In this paper therefore we set out a series of recommendations for reform of that
process. They culminate in the radical proposal for legislative change. This step is
needed in our view because nothing less than a cultural change in how our political,
administrative and interest group institutions view public expenditure determination
will succeed in promoting fundamentally-based restraint.
Internalising the costs of public expenditure
The literature would suggest that end point controls such as spending limits and
process controls are competing options (von Hagen and Harden, 1994) in combating
fiscal illusion. Our view is that in practice these approaches are complementary rather
than competitive. Indeed we see a case for making such outcome targets an integral
part of the control process. Proper control is required to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness of public expenditure but overriding this is the need to ensure
sustainability of the public finances. In principle one could argue that if an appropriate
control process were in place the outcome of this process should be consistent with
financial sustainability.  A more pragmatic perspective would be that this outcome will
only emerge fortuitously and hence the ultimate constraint must always be foremost in
the minds of parties to the budget process. At the very least we suggest that there is a
strong argument for end-point controls while a thorough-going and validated control4
process is being put in place. The argument is reinforced in the current Irish context by
the fact that spending has been growing so rapidly over the past seven years.
We believe that there are five key elements in reforming the process of expenditure
decision making:
• the promulgation of a medium-term sustainability framework
• the implementation of an expenditure “envelope”
• value for money (VFM) evaluation of public expenditure
• well-designed control incentives and disincentives
• a legislative foundation
 
 A medium-term sustainability framework
 
 What outcome constraints are possible? Logically one should start with the deficit. The
Stability Pact provides for balance over the economic cycle which, implies an
unchanged level of debt in absolute terms over the cycle and a secular decline in the
ratio of debt to GDP. Assuming that the resultant trajectory for the debt is acceptable
(a controversial assumption for highly-indebted governments like those of Belgium and
Italy, if not also in the Irish case), this leaves Member States free to determine the
appropriate mix between spending, taxation and the cyclical component of the
deficit/surplus. Given a medium-term target for two of these components the target for
the third emerges residually.
 
 In the steady state, this mix is relatively easy to determine in terms of low and stable
taxation and debt burdens with spending taking up the slack. In the Irish context there
would clearly be a view that we are some way off this steady-state world. The widely
held view is that the tax burden needs to be reduced, so it makes the striking of that
balance a more overtly political act. A variety of approaches might be conceived of to
determine this balance.
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 In the context of the Stability Pact one obvious way would be to determine spending
increases and tax "givebacks" on the basis of projected trend GNP growth. Any excess
over trend would perforce reduce debt. The balance between spending and tax
"givebacks" can't be determined by simple rules. But what is clearly needed is a clear
statement of a medium-term framework within which annual decisions can be made on
coherent basis. This statement would need to be constantly promulgated until all
parties to the budget process accept it. The absence of a medium-term framework, or if
there was one it was not widely known of, in recent years has meant ridiculous
pressure being placed on governments to adjust spending and taxation decisions on the
basis of the latest "surprising" outcomes for growth and tax revenues.
 
 Our first recommendation therefore is:
 
 that Government should set out a medium-term macroeconomic framework within
which annual policy decisions can be appraised.
 
 The Stability Pact provides the context but it needs to be supplemented by the
implications and political decisions that flow therefrom in terms of spending increases,
tax "givebacks" and debt reductions.
 
 This framework would need to be tweaked only when information emerges which
would require adjusting the trend growth assumptions.  We wouldn't go as far as
suggesting the interesting institutional reform of von Hagen and Harden who
recommend the establishment of a National Debt Board, entirely independent of
Government which would decide on medium term and consistent annual debt targets.
While the creation of a medium-term framework involves technical actions it is
fundamentally in our view an exercise in political economy.  By removing responsibility
for a key aspect of the framework to an outside agency, the principle of democratic
accountability is weakened and an important opportunity is thereby missed to ingrain a
culture of process control into our system of national budgeting.
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 How does our recommendation sit with the inauguration of multi-annual budgeting
(MAB) in last January's Budget? The difference is subtle and one of degree. Our view
is that the medium-term framework must drive the process and not simply be a
technical exercise that sets out in a limited way the consequences of current decisions.
We say limited because our perspective of the medium-term framework would involve
the presentation of a full set of macroeconomic projections together with assumptions.
This framework should ideally show the governments intention's for the medium term
and not simply the medium-term consequences of current decisions. This essentially is
what the MAB exercise does. This exercise would be more appropriate to assessing
the consequences of given expenditure and budget proposals in the preparatory phase
of the Budget's construction. Unless we are to take the MAB projections as a
reflection of the Government's medium-term fiscal intentions then it loses its potency
as a control mechanism.
 
 Implementing the expenditure “envelope”
 
 The medium-term framework advocated above implies targets for spending, taxation
and debt. Of the three factors it is clear that the spending component is the most
difficult to control. Taxation and debt targets and the strategies to implement them are
largely left within the compass of the Minister of Finance
1. No other Minister has a
direct interest in the outcomes of these targets as far as his own Ministry is concerned
and hence is unlikely to present a stubborn resistance to the Finance Minister's
preferences.  The exact opposite happens with expenditure
2. The role of the Minister
and of the Department generally is brought into conflict with the line ministries and
especially the large spending ones.
 
 Effective control requires a highly centralised system with the Minister of Finance and
the Taoiseach as key players. In such a system an enunciated spending target may help
control but it might eventually prove to be unnecessary. In a more decentralised system
                                                       
 
1 In recent years the Minister's influence has been lessened by the operation of national wage
agreements.
 
2 We include tax expenditures here.7
like ours
3 a spending target would seem to be a necessary element of control but
experience has told us it certainly isn't a sufficient condition.
 
 While the previous Government broke new ground in having an explicit spending
target there was no process innovation to facilitate its attainment. This to us was the
primary source of the failure to achieve control. It was almost as if the mere existence
of the target was expected through an “invisible hand” process to deliver a consistent
outcome. On this premise the current Government is no more likely to attain its
target
4, although its control aggregate (Central Fund plus Net Supply Services
spending) is more susceptible to successful targeting (and manipulation) than that of its
predecessor (Gross Supply Services Spending). In this regard it is worth noting that
the current government has already taken steps to exploit the pliability of its control
aggregate by boosting the 1997 base from which the 1998 ceiling will be derived to the
tune of £250m, through the payment in September of £150m to the pensions funds of
An Post and Telecom and £100m to the Small Savings Reserve Fund, neither of which
was provided for in the Budget.
 
 Nigel Lawson (1992) described the traditional British system, which determined the
annual supply of services, as the “brick by brick” system. In this highly decentralised
system the Chancellor of the Exchequer for much of this process could only watch
from the sideline. The infamous bilaterals between the Treasury and the departments
doubtlessly placed the Chancellor in a position where he was fighting a losing battle.
The Conservative Governments of the eighties significantly reformed the system by
instituting what Lawson describes as the “envelope” system. In this arrangement the
Chancellor and the Prime Minister become the key players. A spending envelope is
proposed which line departments are compelled to adhere except for exceptional
reasons. Exceptional reasons for breaches of the envelope fell to be resolved by the so-
called Star Chamber. Generally the Star Chamber system worked well. According to
Lawson it was most successful when it was chaired by a strong personality like Willie
                                                       
 
3 von Hagen and Harden (1994) place Ireland among the most decentralised of control systems.
 
4 Given the balance of political parties within the Government von Hagen’s and Harden’s (1994)
finding that single-party Government's are more likely to achieve control provides some grounds for
hope!.8
Whitelaw. More generally von Hagen and Harden suggest that the key to the
successful operation of such a Cabinet sub-committee is that its members must not
have a vested interest in the expenditure outcomes. Ideally they should be powerful
ministers without portfolio. A well-functioning Chamber would rarely have to meet.
Its mere existence should act as a credible threat to errant ministers.
 
 Clearly such a system is not perfect. A crude “envelope” system of itself cannot
promote greater economic efficiency or effectiveness in public expenditure
programmes. Its most obvious shortcoming is its adoption of the previous year’s
outcome as the base for the current year’s spending. Another important shortcoming is
that it imposes a uniform ceiling on spending growth across all departments and
ignores pertinent differences (such as different rates of cost inflation, changing policy
priorities that have implications for departmental shares in the total, or legitimate
demands caused by once-off exigencies). We address these issues below. Moreover its
value as a control mechanism depends very much on the degree of authority which is
centred in the finance ministry buttressed perhaps by a strongly independent Star
Chamber-type committee.
 
 Our system of determining supply services spending can be characterised as the “brick
by brick” system. The previous Government grafted an overall-spending limit onto this
system. Our view is that the “brick by brick” system is fundamentally at odds with the
“envelope” approach and the two systems cannot meaningfully coexist. Recognition of
this point was not apparent over the last two years.
 
 Once the 2% limit was adopted by the last Government it seems to us it should have
led to two significant changes in the procedures governing the generation of the
spending estimates.
 
 First, the traditional “brick by brick” system should have largely fallen into abeyance.
In its place each department ought to have been obliged to prepare their estimates
strictly within the envelope. A simple way of focusing departments might be to only
permit them to prepare their estimates in terms of an overall share of spending (Milesi-9
Feretti (1997)). Departures from the envelope would be countenanced only in
exceptional circumstances.
 
 Care has to be employed in devising the “envelope” quantum. The medium-term
macroeconomic framework will assist the political determination of the tradeoff
between spending, tax “givebacks” and reductions in debt. It would clearly not be
sensible to apply the determined spending cap (say x%) from this exercise to each
government department. For one, a prudent allowance should be made for
precautionary expenditures that could arise in the year ahead. Secondly, differential-
spending requirements may arise across departments for a number of reasons, for
example, predictable divergences in price deflators. Moreover it would be absurd to
permit a department’s expenditure to rise in line with the overall cap when, in the
absence of the cap, spending growth might in fact be lower!
 
 A feasible means of coping with these considerations would be as follows. A fraction
(say y%) of the overall-spending cap should be first set aside for precautionary
expenditures. A fraction (say z%) of the remainder (x%-y%) would become the
envelope for individual departments. The residual (x%-y%-z%) would then become
available for exceptional spending requirements arising in individual departments. No
individual department should of course have a prior claim on this residual.
 Second, we believe that a Star Chamber-type arrangement would seem to be a
necessary supporting element of the “envelope” system. It would exist in the first
instance to resolve the hopefully small set of issues that could not be resolved within
the “envelope” arrangement in bilaterals between the departments and Finance. Its
main task, however, would be to decide on the allocation of the spending residual.
 
 During the Rainbow's term of office neither of these two crucial steps were
implemented, although a number of innovative budgetary procedures were put in
place
5. Clearly the 2% limit existed as an external lever to be used by Finance every
                                                       
 
5 Among these was the move to an autumn budget hence the transparent unification of the spending
and tax sides of the Budget process and the inauguration of  multi-annual budgeting (MAB). Mention
should also be mentioned of the Tax Strategy Group (TSG) which was an inter-departmental
committee of civil advisers and civil servants charged with the task of advising on budgetary strategy.10
now and again in an attempt to focus ministers on the need for restraint. But it did not
systematically inform the estimates’ process. Of far greater significance, as an external
lever, was the need to adhere to the Maastricht criteria and the medium-term strictures
likely to be imposed by the Stability Pact and the scaling back of Structural Funds.
 
 Nor was there any structure such as the Star Chamber put in place. There did of
course exist a Cabinet Budget sub-committee chaired by the Taoiseach
6. However, it
resembled the Star Chamber neither in terms of its composition or remit, perhaps
because of the nature of the three-party government. It was composed of line ministers
with big spending budgets. Its focus was also diffuse. Unlike how the Star Chamber
appeared to function, the sub-Committee deliberated on the general progress of the
budget process and addressed issues as they arose. It did not have the direct remit to
essentially tidy up the loose ends from the Finance bilaterals.
 
 In effect the Cabinet on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance fashions the
shape of the Budget parameters. As von Hagen and Harden sagely observe one cannot
expect effective spending control to emerge from such a system. The process of
determining consensus is biased towards more spending rather than less because of the
operation of reciprocity in the spending positions of most ministers. Put in other
words, a series of “you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours” horse trades is unlikely
to favour a modest outcome in the overall spending aggregate. Arguably, this sort of
horse-trading is more likely to prevail in a coalition government than a single-party
administration. Given that coalitions are likely to be the rule rather than the exception
in years to come, this is all the more reason to carry out some radical process re-
engineering.
 
 These thoughts lead us to our second recommendation:
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Those of us involved in this Committee can testify to its usefulness in airing broader tax policy issues
and in confronting the political tradeoffs with perhaps more considered deliberation than might have
been the case in the past. It also helped the proceedings that the TSG's deliberations were in the
context of buoyant growth and revenues.
 
6 We have written this in the past tense because we don't know whether the Committee is still in
existence.11
 an expenditure target implies the need to abandon the traditional "brick by brick"
approach to the estimates’ process and its replacement by the "envelope" system. A
Star Chamber type sub-committee of the Cabinet would appear to be a necessary
integral part of such a control process.
 
 Value for money (VFM) assessment of public expenditure
 
 Even if an “envelope” system were to be instituted along the lines we've outlined it
does not of itself deal with the fundamental issue of the economic efficiency and
effectiveness of public spending. As noted above, one obvious shortcoming is that it
adopts the previous year as the base for the current year's spending. Most economists
would favour a zero-based approach to determining the spending outcome in any given
year.  A first objection to such a proposal might be that it doesn’t take account of
predetermined expenditures. No item of spending should be automatically accepted as
being predetermined. This also applies to demand-led programmes since the issue of
cost-minimising delivery and fraud minimisation ought to be a constant aspect of the
review of such programmes
7.  A second objection to zero-based budgeting is that it
would be impractical to institute such a system for every expenditure programme every
year. This is a valid criticism but what might work is a requirement that, for instance,
each major programme be reviewed on a zero-based approach every five years.
 
 The Department of Finance may respond to this suggestion and say that this is already
being implemented in the context of the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI).  Our
counter is that while this may well be and it's early days to adjudicate on its impact, the
system being put in pace lacks the fundamental requirement of transparency which
appears to us to be a prerequisite for any evaluation system which stands a chance of
being effective.  Moreover it’s not clear to us whether Finance's zero-based approach
is to become an integral arm of the annual estimates’ process.
 
                                                       
 
7 Witness the actual savings yielded by the review procedures put in place in the wake of last year's
comparative analysis of the Live Register and Labour Force Surveys.12
 Transparency in what passes for VFM evaluation is necessary in order to appraise the
quality of evaluation and more importantly to generate parliamentary debate on the
explicit and implicit choices involved in public expenditure allocations. If such
evaluations are seen to be no more than a new fad management technique, they will fail
to infuse a culture of evaluation into our political system. The procedures and
principles of evaluation need to be publicly known and debated and above all, the
outcomes should be published and subject to public scrutiny.
 
 There is, ironically, a ready-made evaluation system in place within the public service
that could be readily adapted to all public spending programmes. We are referring of
course to the evaluation system in place for the Structural Funds. This system has a
number of elements. First, all Structural Fund expenditure is classified on a programme
basis that facilitates evaluation. While the programme classifications do not always
permit a ready economic evaluation, as the ESRI's recent study demonstrates (see
Honohan et al,1997), it's a good starting point. (In this regard there is surely a strong
case for resurrecting A Better Way To Plan The Nation's Finances.)  Second, each
programme has an associated set of quantifiable objectives, input, output and impact
indicators which in principle facilitate effective monitoring. Third, a more thorough
evaluation system is in place which allows for full-scale mid-term and end-term reviews
of each programme and the entire CSF (see Honohan et al, 1997). Most of these
reviews are conducted by consultants that are external to the public service. In addition
a number of evaluation units have been created within the civil service. There is a
central CSF Unit in the Department of Finance with a complement of three evaluators.
Within Enterprise and Employment there are two evaluation units: the ESF Unit and
the Industry Unit. The ESF Unit has a staff of 8 evaluators and the Industry Unit has
four evaluators. The Department of Agriculture has recently set up its own CSF unit
with a staff of three. In addition to these units,  a number of external evaluators are
retained on a daily contract basis in Transport, Industry, Local Development, Fisheries
and Economic Infrastructure Programmes.
 
 While the system is as yet relatively untried it nonetheless appears to us capable of
acting as a VFM template for the totality of public expenditure. As of yet, however, it13
would appear that the Department of Finance views the system as only being relevant
to the Structural Funds. The system may be viewed as a necessary hurdle to be
surmounted in order to secure EU funding.  Finance presumably would argue that it is
constantly engaged in VFM evaluation and there is no need to institute a new
institutional structure. The crucial difference, however, with the CSF evaluation system
is its relative transparency. The basis of evaluation is fairly explicit and in many cases
the evaluations are published and hence available for public scrutiny.
 
 In effect we now have a dual approach to the evaluation of public-spending
programmes. We have the fairly transparent CSF system and the much less transparent
non-CSF system. This appears at the very least to be somewhat lopsided. Some
indication of the lopsided nature of our approach to VFM evaluation can be got from
examining the importance of EU receipts relative to total government expenditure as in
Table 2. These data highlight the ironic situation that, whereas EU receipts account for
8% of total voted capital and non-capital spending and are thereby subject to a highly
transparent and, on the face of it, serious and thorough regular evaluation, the greater
bulk of public expenditure escapes a similar scrutiny. About 60% of the Agriculture
vote; around 70% of the Education, Environment and Tourism votes and nearly 80%
of the Enterprise and Employment vote escape equally transparent evaluation. Noting
that the entire Social Welfare and Health votes evade similar appraisal perhaps better
makes the point.
 
 Another indication of our schizophrenic approach to public expenditure evaluation is
to examine the actual number of Community Support Framework (CSF) evaluations
that have been carried out to date (Table 2). There has been an impressive output of
evaluations especially for Industry, Tourism, Transport and Human Resources.  Yet
this output begs the question as to why similar evaluations are not available for non-
CSF spending?
 
 While there is much to commend in the Structural Fund evaluation system, there are
still some initiatives that could be undertaken to improve both the quality and14
transparency of the evaluation process
8. It is disappointing that many of the analyses
are not published and subject to academic scrutiny. The recent ESRI study draws
 
 Table 2
 EU Receipts Relative to Voted capital and Non-Capital Expenditure and CSF
Evaluation Output
 














 1993 To date
 Trans. Energy &
Comm.
 1  3  28
a
 Environment  8  28  4
 Education  18  27  32
b
 Agr., Food &
Forestry
 6  39  12
 Enterprise and
Employment
 5  22  33
c
 Tourism and Trade  1  32  15
 Total  100  8  7
d
 a  includes economic infrastructure.
 b all human resources (some of these reports could be attached to the E&E 
vote).
 c includes local development (the latter category is not included in the 
expenditure figure).
 d refers to overall CSF evaluations.
 
 attention to deficiencies in some of the CSF-related Cost-Benefit studies which have
been undertaken and there is a strong undercurrent in their Report that many of the
individual evaluations of the Operational Programmes were less than satisfactory from
a methodological point of view.
 
 Apart from the reasonable appeal that all publicly-funded evaluations should be
published there is also a compelling case for an audit of evaluations by some competent
body. This would provide a check on the possibility of  “departmental capture” of
individual programme evaluations. Afterall an external consultant is being paid by the
                                                       
 
8 The CSF Evaluation Unit within the Department of Finance is preparing a directory of evaluations
carried out under the Structural Funds.15
department commissioning the evaluation and no doubt will be anxious to secure
additional commissions.  The temptation for consultants to be less than frank in their
criticism of programmes is all too possible. Secondly, the existence of a random audit
on a periodic basis should provide a mechanism for introducing quality control at a
methodological level.
 
 The agency which would appear in the best position to execute such VFM audits
would appear to be the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG). This office has in
recent years acquired the remit for VFM assessment and has also enhanced its staff
resources to carry out this function. It has also carried out and published a small
number of evaluations of evaluations.
 
 This leads to our recommendation that:
 
 the Structural Fund evaluation system should be extended to all public expenditure
programmes and supplemented with a VFM auditing role of these evaluations by the
C&AG.
 
 Control incentives and disincentives
 
 The recommendations set out above are designed over a period of time to institute a
system which is more likely to counteract the tendencies towards fiscal illusion which
exist in our current arrangements for the management of public expenditure. However,
we believe that simple rules can also play a useful role in combating fiscal illusion. For
instance, suppose it were ordained that no spending proposal (including tax
expenditures), and certainly no proposal for new spending, were not to be entertained
by the Minister for Finance unless associated with it were detailed proposals as to how
the resources to pay for the additional spending were to be secured. These costs should
be identified on a full-year basis together with their intertemporal profile following the
MAB procedure. The necessary resources, whether they involve cuts in measures
within the sponsoring department’s remit or in other departments or additional taxation
or borrowing, should receive equal due consideration in appraising the new spending16
proposals. There is no reason why such a requirement should not also extend to the
representations of lobbies.
 
 We have argued above so far for a systematic approach to VFM evaluation of public
expenditure programmes. But given that the pay and pensions' bill accounts for over
50% of total current expenditure, a system of expenditure control, which left pay out
of the reckoning, would be severely deficient. There has to be some mechanism that
ensures productivity and real cost savings in the delivery of public services.  The SMI
sets itself the admirable goal of delivering such quality improvement but we would
suggest a more radical surgery is needed.
 
 The opportunity to effect real productivity improvements in pay seems to be only
presented to Government in the context of the national pay agreements. But even in
this context the scope for delivering real savings looks to be quite limited. In the
negotiation of Partnership 2000 it would appear that the focus really wasn't on the bill
itself, except only indirectly through the negotiation of public-sector pay rates. The
productivity clause is modest with a potential 2% saving over 39 months. And while
the agreement indicates that payment of the productivity bonus must follow verifiable
productivity improvements, past experience would lead one to be sceptical about this
prospect being realised.
 
 Our view is that there is no good reason why the State sector should not on an annual
basis yield a productivity improvement equal to the economy-wide norm. Suppose
such a stricture were factored into the estimates, by for example adjusting the
expenditure base each year by say a productivity factor of at least 1%-2%, would this
not be a mechanism for effecting savings?
 
 We would go further and suggest that decentralised pay and non-pay departmental
budgets would be a powerful mechanism for delivering productivity improvements. In
addition the department Secretary General would have hiring and firing privileges.
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 These suggestions are put forward as stick mechanisms and they should be balanced by
incentives. One obvious incentive mechanism might to permit departments to earmark
a fraction of their productivity and other savings, from for instance the abandonment or
scaling back of existing programmes, for the introduction of new programmes or the
extension of existing ones. For instance, departments could be permitted to earmark
50%+ of savings for this purpose. All such additional spending proposals would of
course be subject to the rigorous VFM assessment that we advocate.
 
 It has to be of course recognised that it is easy to suggest methodologies for promoting
productivity improvement when one doesn't have to implement them in an industrial
relations environment. This consideration notwithstanding, we put forward our next
recommendation:
 
 agencies providing public expenditure programmes should be required to yield
productivity improvements of 1%-2% per annum and departments would be permitted
to retain 70% of programme savings for new spending initiatives which satisfied
adequate VFM appraisal.
 
 A Legislative Foundation
 
 Many of our recommendations, designed to enhance the prospects for reining-in
spending growth, could be viewed as essentially of a procedural nature and thus could
be seen as necessary components of a public expenditure management information
system. If this is all that would be necessary to address the problem of fiscal illusion,
the issue would not so interesting to political economists. What we believe is required
is an institutional change that will alter the entire culture of public expenditure
deliberations. In particular, we champion a system which confronts the tendency for
fiscal illusion head on and which promotes VFM and effectiveness' appraisals of public
expenditure on a routine basis.
 
 The SMI has the potential to transform the provision of public services but without an
engagement of the political actors (including the lobbies) in the process of expenditure18
control expenditure, successful control is likely to remain an elusive goal. This is why
we believe the recommendations we set out should form the spine of a legislative
reform initiative. Legislation governing the procedures for the preparation of budgets
has the potential to force the political system to confront the real constraints that are
involved in expenditure choices. In addition to the procedures set out above we would
obviously place a great store on the importance of transparency at every stage of the
process. Transparency implies much greater facility for parliamentary debate at
designated stages during the process as well as publication of evaluations reports etc.
 
 Our thinking regarding the type of legislation needed is very much influenced by New
Zealand's Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1994 (New Zealand Treasury, 1997). It’s worth
quoting the NZ treasury on the objectives of the Act because it conforms so closely to
our own thinking. According to the Treasury:
 
 “The Act sets outs to do five things:
 
• increase the transparency of policy intentions and the economic and fiscal
consequences of policy;
• bring a long-term (as well as an annual) focus to budgeting;
• disclose the aggregate impact of a Budget in advance of the detailed budget
allocation allocations;
• ensure independent assessment and reporting of fiscal policy; and
• facilitate parliamentary and public scrutiny of economic and fiscal information and
plans.”
The legislation is as far from the balanced-budget-type amendment championed by
some US legislators (see Electronic Policy Network) as you could get. It doesn’t set
out rigid deficit, spending or tax parameters which governments must adhere to but
instead sets out a series of principles that should inform the formulation and execution
of fiscal policy. The Act lays especial stress on promoting a strategic approach to
policy development that gives due emphasis to the long-term economic and financial
consequences of current fiscal policy decisions.  Stringent reporting of key steps in the19
budget cycle is also stipulated in the legislation with the explicit objective of ensuring
that “… the Government of the day has to be transparent about both its intentions and
the short- and long-term impact of its spending and taxation decisions”.
A most interesting feature of the Act is the requirement on Government to produce a
series of publications in relation to its conduct of fiscal policy throughout the Budget
cycle
9. Of particular note is the obligation to produce a Budget Policy Statement a
couple of months before the Budget. According to the Treasury the thinking behind
this requirement is to:
“… separate[s] debate on the overall fiscal strategy from questions of detailed budget
allocations … This ensures some debate on the aggregate impact of the proposed
Budget and helps make the trade-offs between debt, taxes and expenses more explicit.”
At the time of the Budget the Government is required to publish a Fiscal Strategy
Statement which is designed to ensure consistency between actual Budget decisions
and the intentions set out in the earlier Budget Policy Statement. Any departures from
this Statement are required to be explained by Government. There is also an obligation
to produce the equivalent of our own MABs, except that the future time horizon is
mandated to be for a period of at least 10 years.
Regular Economic and Fiscal Updates are also to be produced throughout the year. In
addition an innovation, which we could surely with benefit adopt here, is the
mandatory publication of a pre-election economic and fiscal update for a three-year
time horizon between 42 and 14 days before the date of a general election.
The legislation also enshrines the principle that the relative responsibilities of the
Minister of Finance and the Secretary to the Treasury be explicitly acknowledged so
that there can be no ambiguity as to where accountability resides.
                                                       
9 Other requirements in the Act include the stipulation that Government accounts must
be presented on both a cash and accruals basis.20
The final element of the legislation which merits noting is the requirement that every
report mentioned under the Act must be laid before a parliamentary committee. The
Committee may call the Minister of Finance to defend any of his reports and it may
also call expert witness and seek expert opinion.
Our final recommendation therefore is that:
legislation along the lines of the New Zealand Fiscal Responsibility Act should be
enacted to underpin control of public expenditure to ensure conformity with financial
sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency.21
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